to pass under the will without the burden of the disadvantages. 3 From a practical standpoint, this doctrine can be used to advantage by a testator seeking a desired result; for example, it can be used to consolidate holdings of corporate stock along a particular family line. Also, the doctrine stands as a warning to the legal practitioner to inventory the assets of the estate and have them appraised as soon as possible after testator's decease; then to determine with the client whether to accept the benefits under the will or not. The statutory right to elect is absolute for a year, 4 and at the end of the year the devisee will be deemed to have made the election, 5 unless he or she performs an act which a court might construe as an act of election. Claiming under the will, or qualifying as executor thereunder, has been held to be such an act.
6 Presumably a petition asking solely for a construction of a will would not be construed as an act of election.
Because of the elements of offer and acceptance involved, these cases would appear to fall in the realm of contract. The doctrine of election is founded on the theory of the surrender of the right for the gift.
7 "But an election not to take under a will does not form the element of offer and acceptance required of a contract." s However, the act of claiming under the will would constitute such acceptance. Some courts have stressed the matter of the clearness of the testator's intention to require an election. In a case where the testatrix devised to one W, in addition to an annuity, only a portion of land which she was under contract to devise in toto, the court held that a case for election did not arise, saying: "The intention (to raise an election) must clearly appear from the document itself, and unless its language unequivocally shows a purpose to dispose of the property belonging to the donee the law will not presume an intention to do so."
9 This case appears to go beyond the rule in the majority of these cases. In most of them the courts say that it must be made clear by the will beyond all reasonable doubt that the testator intentionally assumed to dispose of his devisee's real estate before he can be held to an election. 10 Most courts look at the substance of the will as well as the express terms. In the principal case the Wisconsin Court cited several cases from outside jurisdictions in support of the general proposition that it must be 3Allen v. Boomer, 82 Wis. 364, 52 N.W. 426 (1892) . 4 Wis. Stats., 233.14 (1947) , and principal case at p. 306. 5 Principal case, where a year having passed, the widow was declared to have elected. clear on the face of the will that the testator intended to dispose of the donee's property." From the discussion of the law in the principal case it would appear either that the court overlooked this phase of the case, or was of the opinion, without expressing it, that it was clear from the will that the testator intended to dispose of his wife's interest in the property.
A point of interest appears in the case in regard to the joint tenancy. There is no doubt that it is ended, inasmuch as the four' unities have been severed. 2 The result is a tenancy-in-common. 1 3 From the practitioner's standpoint the exact time of the severance is important. The severance occurs when the widow elects, or when the statutory period of election terminates; and the termination "relates back" to the time of the death. The only right which vests is the right of choice. Therefore the liens of judgment creditors on the testator's interest must be considered "suspended" until the election is made. At the testator's death they would not be liens, 15 but since title passes at the time of election, the liens would then settle on the half-interest devised to the daughter, the widow's portion becoming free and clear at severance. The reasoning may well be held to apply to the right of the widow to the rents and profits of the homestead, with the final settlement and account determined by the election made. It should be noted at this point that the statute governing the homestead and the election in this state has been well drawn and covers the case without further discussion."
It might also be noted that an examiner of titles should make inquiry, in instances of joint tenancy ownership and upon knowledge of the death of one of the joint tenants, as to the existence of a will. If a will is existent it should be admitted to probate so the examiner can determine if it attempts to dispose of a part or all of the joint property. If it does, then both the surviving joint tenant and the devisee should join in the conveyance, unless the surviving tenant filed a formal election under the will. If no will has been admitted it would seem that the surviving joint tenant's conveyance to a purchaser should be construed as an election not to take under the will, if one should subsequently be filed and admitted to probate.
On the face of the matter, this case appears to overturn the long -established law of survivorship in Wisconsin. Actually this is not so. What does occur is that title becomes vested in the surviving joint tenant at the moment of the other's death, subject to divestment by his or her own act of electing to take the benefits under the will. The election operates to sever the joint tenancy. The case opens the door for the severing of joint tenancies by indirection, making possible certain transfers which might be difficult to effect personally during the lifetime of the testator.
